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A B S T R A C T   
As ShakeAlert, the earthquake early warning system for the West Coast of the U.S., begins its transition to operational public alerting, we explore how post-alert 
messaging might represent system performance. Planned post-alert messaging can provide timely, crucial information to both emergency managers and Shake-
Alert operators as well as calibrate expectations among various publics or public user groups and inform their responses to future alerts. There is a concern among the 
scientists and emergency managers that false alerts may negatively impact trust in the system, so quickly disseminated post-alert messages are necessary. For a new 
early warning system, such as ShakeAlert, this is particularly relevant given that the potentially affected population is likely to be unfamiliar with this system. We 
address this concern in six steps: (1) assessment of ShakeAlert performance to date, (2) characterization of human behavior and response to earthquake alerts, (3) 
presentation of a decision tree for issuing post-alert messages, (4) design of a critical set of post-alert messaging scenarios, (5) elaboration of these scenarios with 
message templates for a variety of communication channels, and (6) development of a typology of earthquake alerts. We further explore methods for monitoring and 
evaluating ShakeAlert post-alert messaging, for continuous improvement to the system.   
1. Introduction 
As the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) and its partners allow for 
broader access to the earthquake early warning system, ShakeAlert, on 
the West Coast of the United States (Washington, Oregon, and Califor-
nia), there is increasing recognition that its effectiveness depends on the 
expectations, trust, and responses of West Coast communities to the 
system [1]. Post-alert messaging is messaging that is sent after an initial 
alert has been distributed via various channels. Distribution of post-alert 
messaging may be critical to building trust and appropriate expectations 
of ShakeAlert from various publics. Publics is a term that refers to the 
key groups and individuals, whether by locality or interest, which a 
specific communication is intended for and with whom a communicator 
interacts [91]. ‘Publics’ is the umbrella term for receivers, audiences, 
and communities [92]. Developing this messaging pre-event is impor-
tant for fast and effective dissemination. Successful post-alert messages 
are best designed by identifying likely alert system performance 
scenarios, within post-alert messaging capabilities, and examining the 
likely expectations and information needs of alert recipients based on 
findings from the social and behavioral science disciplines. This paper 
addresses those needs as they apply to ShakeAlert. Planning ahead for 
post-alert response will support efficiencies during crisis, clearer com-
munications, and therefore more effective responses to alerts and 
earthquakes. This is particularly relevant for ShakeAlert, as the public 
becomes more familiar with this new earthquake early warning system 
in the western U.S. 
Post-event reports on the 2018 Hawai’i Ballistic Missile False Alert 
[2,3] confirmed decades of crisis communication research by illustrating 
the need for fast communication by agencies if a warning system per-
forms outside expectations of users, including false alerts [3–10]. Even if 
details of the situation are not available in the early minutes after a false 
or otherwise potentially confusing alert, organizations cannot afford to 
wait to communicate something to the public [11–15]. By communi-
cating quickly, organizations engender trust in capabilities to manage 
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the situation during times of crisis or perceived failures [5,6,12,16,17, 
80,83]. “All-clear” messaging,1 meaning that the situation is no longer 
dangerous, could be useful and appropriate in some situations [18]. 
Further, we argue that there is a need for better post-alert messaging that 
addresses users’ experiences and expectations in the specific context of 
ShakeAlert. Issuing post-alert messaging within minutes of alerts re-
quires advance consideration of message content and how it may be 
perceived and acted upon by an anxious public. 
The remainder of this introduction sets the stage for developing a 
ShakeAlert post-alert messaging strategy, by characterizing the current 
state of early warning systems and the widely used signal-detection alert 
types. Subsequent sections present our research methods, our results 
(presented in six steps), then discussion of limitations and conclusions. 
1.1. Early warning systems 
Early warning systems are implemented globally [19,20,93]. Those 
for earthquakes, lahars, and tornadoes rely on near-instantaneous 
warning, which is a unique challenge of these systems, because it af-
fords little time for scientific interpretation and validation by humans 
[21–24]. While our study is about earthquake early warning systems, 
the tornado literature offers relevant insights on how people respond to 
alarms (“alerts” for this paper) and how false alerts can negatively 
impact the credibility of the organization issuing the alert [22,25–27]. 
False alert tolerance is a product of trust in warning systems; too many 
false alerts can lead to reduced trust in an alert system, which can 
endanger people if and when alerts are correctly sent, and protective 
actions are not taken [26,27]. If people lose trust in the system, they may 
no longer take protective actions, or they may disable alert delivery 
devices altogether [28]. Further research themes to be explored in future 
for early warning systems, generally, are described in Tan et al. [94]. 
Lahar warning systems also are automated and provide important 
warning messages with very little time [24,95]. In New Zealand, a lahar 
warning system exists on the Mt. Ruapehu ski fields and relies on sirens 
[21,24]. As lahars provide little natural warning, alert systems have 
been placed in areas where people are at greatest risk from lahars to 
signal the need for immediate evacuation [21]. However, we found little 
useful evidence regarding how people responded to false alerts for 
lahars. 
Different countries use diverse communication channels for their 
largely automated warning systems. Sirens and prerecorded messages 
broadcast on a public address (PA) system are used in many countries to 
warn people of lahars and tornadoes, and, in the case of Mexico City, 
earthquakes [29]. Mexico City has long used sirens as the primary 
warning channel, with the sirens emitting a characteristic sound to alert 
residents when earthquake shaking is imminent [30]. In Central Java, 
Indonesia, on the Merapi Volcano, traditional methods (drums) combine 
with the modern broadcast warning system [23]. Critical to the suc-
cessful use of sirens and broadcast messages is that the community be 
informed about what they mean before they are used, that unique 
sounds are used for alerting for different hazards, for drills or tests rather 
than for actual alerts, and that the community is prepared to take 
appropriate protective actions when they sound [20,28,31]. 
For the U.S.-based ShakeAlert system, public alerts are being pro-
vided, as of October 2019, to publics in California via the MyShake app 
as explored in Strauss et al. [32] and Wireless Emergency Alerts (WEAs) 
[33]. Other alerting delivery apps exist or are under development. For 
example, Los Angeles County residents were the first publics to receive 
the alerts through a smartphone app, which was made available in 
January 2019 and developed by the City of Los Angeles [34]. Thresholds 
for this app were lowered in July 2019, so people in Los Angeles County 
who download the app can receive alerts when a magnitude (M) 4.5 
earthquake occurs and ground shaking is predicted to be at least a 
Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI) of III at the user’s location [34]; this 
shaking level is considered “Weak” [35]. 
Overall, we found that experiences and expectations of warning 
systems vary depending on the type of hazard, the population affected, 
and the system used. 
1.2. Types of alert outcomes 
Different warning performance typologies can result from alert sys-
tems. For example, Trainor et al. [36] uses the warning typology with 
false, hit (correct), miss, and all clear (correct no alert). Fig. 1 [37] il-
lustrates four types of alert outcomes that are acknowledged in earth-
quake early warning systems and are based on the presence or absence 
of an event (e.g., an earthquake), and whether or not the system issued 
an alert: false, correct, missed, or correct no alert [38]. A false alert 
occurs when an event is not observed, but an alert is sent; a correct alert 
occurs when an event is observed and an alert is sent; a missed alert 
occurs when an event is observed, but no alert is sent; and a correct no 
alert when there is no event observed, and populations are not alerted 
[38]. 
Many warning systems adopt this quadrant classification—whether 
for tornadoes, volcanoes, or for air traffic control—to describe missed or 
false alerts [26,40–43]. In weather and other warning contexts, these 
classifications are based on the dimensions of occurrence (e.g., was there 
a tornado or in this circumstance, did an earthquake occur) and detec-
tion (e.g., did the system detect the event) which is based on signal 
detection theory [44]. 
Perceptions of systems are also a critical factor. Trainor et al. [36] 
found that perceptions and definitions of false alerts vary, and that the 
variance largely depends upon whether or not the receiver believed the 
alert was justified, specifically if there was a perception that forecasters 
did not have a justifiable reason to send the message. An added layer of 
complexity is the concept of alerting thresholds, i.e., when to send alerts 
to users and when not to. For the ShakeAlert system, Minson et al. [38] 
noted that for earthquakes, the alerting threshold can be set to be lower 
or higher than the shaking level that might cause damage, depending on 
the user’s tolerance of false alerts. In response to the feedback received 
from users of the app, developed by City of Los Angeles to alert residents 
in the county following the 2019 Ridgecrest, California, M 6.4 and 7.1 
earthquakes, alerting thresholds were lowered. Residents were not 
warned because the shaking levels were not forecast to be sufficient to 
cause damage, but some people expressed the desire to be alerted in the 
future for lower levels of potential felt shaking, not just those thought to 
be damage-inducing [96]. 
The concept of a false alert is complex; perceptions from various 
users can be nuanced and may include, for example, assigning blame for 
Fig. 1. Warning performance typology (reprint of Fig. 1c from Ref. [37]). PGA 
means Peak Ground Acceleration. 
1 An “all-clear” is “a signal that tells you that a dangerous or difficult situa-
tion has ended” (Cambridge English Dictionary definition). 
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error [36]. In the case of tornadoes, this is well understood by fore-
casters and the agencies issuing warnings. This group understands that 
high false alarm rates reduce recipients’ tendency to respond to alarms 
[27]. This raises a concern about whether false alerts will decrease trust 
in an earthquake early warning system. From the alert or warning re-
cipient’s perspective, at least three additional dimensions are important: 
Did they personally feel it, did they receive an alert, and was there a 
risk? Warnings for near misses, for example if a tornado occurred nearby 
but not close enough to cause damage at individual’s location, have not 
been regarded as false alerts by the warning recipients [45]. Therefore, 
for earthquake early warning even if someone is alerted but does not feel 
shaking, they may not perceive this as a false alert. 
One counterargument is that people may not be so forgiving of 
earthquake early warning systems built on seismic networks that are 
sensitive to and register the seismic signals caused by other events, such 
as quarry blasts, heavy road traffic, and even exuberant dancing [46,47]. 
The potential for false alerts to decrease trust in the system, together 
with the discrepancies between what warning issuers and recipients 
define as false alerts, suggest that the issuers of alerts may be concerned 
with the reputation risks of issuing false alerts, more so than those 
receiving false alerts. Importantly, this balance depends on a more 
nuanced view of false and missed alerts than the standard 2  2 warning 
performance typology (Fig. 1) permits. In this paper, we develop a 
framework for post-alert messaging based on the nuanced ways in which 
alerting systems may behave and be perceived by end users, as noted in 
Minson et al. [37]. 
2. Methods and results 
To evaluate potential post-alert messaging strategies for ShakeAlert, 
the USGS convened an interdisciplinary working group of seismologists, 
social scientists with expertise in risk communication and decision 
making, emergency managers, and communication practitioners. The 
working group assessed the needs and possibilities for post-alert 
messaging, with this article representing the process and outcomes of 
this group. This assessment was both iterative and integrative, and 
included the development of six products: (1) a summary of ShakeAlert 
performance to date using data from ShakeAlert testing and certifica-
tion, (2) a characterization from the literature of what is known about 
human behavior and response to earthquake alerts, (3) a decision chart 
representing the decisions required to issue a post-alert message, (4) a 
critical set of post-alert messaging scenarios developed by the working 
group, (5) a typology of earthquake alerts informed by (1–4), and (6) a 
scenario matrix that includes message templates for various communi-
cation channels developed by the authors using the messaging and 
human behavior literature. 
The next sections describe the methods and results for the multiple 
methods that were used to develop each of the six products. 
2.1. Products and their development method and results  
1) ShakeAlert detection performance and alerting status 
The seismic detection system used in ShakeAlert includes two 
seismic networks: the Pacific Northwest Seismic Network (PNSN) and 
the California Integrated Seismic Network (CISN) [39] which are both 
part of the Advanced National Seismic System (ANSS). The seismic 
detection system is still being expanded; with increased instrumentation 
the proportion of successful detections are expected to improve. 
It is a challenge for seismic networks to locate and characterize 
damaging earthquakes and predict impending shaking quickly and 
accurately enough for EEW on the U.S. West Coast, and the ShakeAlert 
system requires continual testing, research and development to improve 
its effectiveness [1,48]. Earthquakes in this region are geographically 
dispersed and tectonically varied; the amount of shaking that an 
earthquake produces is affected by a number of factors, including the 
details of the earthquake source itself (e.g. Ref. [49]), the distance from 
the earthquake source, and the particulars of seismic wave propagation 
through the region. Both on-land and nearby offshore earthquakes, 
which the system is designed to detect and alert for, and remote earth-
quakes affect the seismic signals that ShakeAlert uses to issue messages. 
For an earthquake to be detected and alerted for in the current Shake-
Alert system, four seismic stations within ShakeAlert networks must 
trigger on the P-waves (primary wave) from the event. A P-wave is the 
first seismic wave generated by an earthquake. S-waves (secondary) are 
slower than the P-Wave and generally cause stronger shaking. The 
ShakeAlert system registers that an earthquake has occurred. The 
earthquake’s location and its magnitude are then rapidly estimated. 
Next, the system predicts the shaking based on the estimated earthquake 
magnitude. Lastly, the alerting area is determined and alerts are sent to 
users, alert distributors, and infrastructure operators (Fig. 2 [39]). The 
accuracy and timeliness of alerts are dependent on many factors, 
including the accuracy of the earthquake location and magnitude esti-
mated by the system, uncertainties in prediction of the resulting ground 
motion, and how much time elapses between the arrival of the initial P 
wave, which sometimes cannot be felt, and the more intense S wave [37, 
38]. It is important to note that with every earthquake there is a late 
alert zone near the epicenter where people will experience shaking 
before an alert can be delivered because of the time it takes to detect the 
earthquake, produce the alert, and deliver it. 
System performance varies, and depends on location and magnitude 
of the earthquake, whether or not multiple earthquakes are occurring 
close in space and time, the density and locations of the seismic stations, 
and the data transmission latency or other processing delays. For 2018 
more than half of the earthquakes of magnitude (M) 4.5 and above were 
detected successfully across the ShakeAlert system in Washington, 
Oregon, and California (Table 1 [1,78]). This was true even though the 
system was evolving and incomplete at the time [1]. Different earth-
quakes produce diverse alert latencies, population impacts, and ground 
shaking. Understanding past performance is critical for knowing how 
the system may behave in the future and what the potential for public 
protective actions may be. For example, the system, when fully devel-
oped, could detect a Cascadia subduction zone earthquake off the 
Washington or Oregon coast of magnitude 9 and issue an alert in time for 
many people to take protective actions. It is more likely, however, that 
the system will be alerting for more frequent and smaller earthquakes, 
for which many of those in the alerted area will receive very short alert 
times. Also likely are situations where alerts are received after shaking 
has arrived, as explored in Minson et al. [38], or alerts that are incorrect 
about the exact timing, location, or intensity of the earthquake. 
The seismic network detection system is foundational to ShakeAlert, 
but so is the alerting system. The network of telecommunication 
channels that distributes alerts to end users makes it possible for 
messages to reach people and technical systems rapidly. As of the 
publication of this article, the ShakeAlert public alerting system is 
available only in California, where public alerts are sent through 
Wireless Emergency Alerts (WEA) and smartphone apps. WEAs are 
emergency messages sent by authorized government alerting 
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authorities through mobile carrier networks [98]. For alerts to be sent, 
both the earthquake magnitude and the predicted shaking at a user’s 
location must exceed a pre-determined threshold that depends on the 
alert distribution pathway (see Ref. [39]) and alerts are issued only 
when these thresholds have been met or exceeded. Specific thresholds 
and smart phone app names are not included in this article as these 
might change rapidly as the system continues to evolve within the next 
few years.  
2) Human behavior and response to earthquake alerts. 
There are three critical aspects to human behavior and response to 
earthquake alerts: how people interpret their experiences (e.g., 
shaking); how they interpret any alert (or absence thereof) as it relates to 
their experience; and what actions they take based on that interpreta-
tion. If people believe that the recommended action will protect them 
from harm, they are more likely to take that action [50]. This 
three-pronged approach informs the template for post-alert messages. 
Evidence regarding how people respond to earthquake early warn-
ings comes largely from Japan [51] and Mexico City [29]. In Mexico 
City, people interviewed described earthquake alerts as useful even 
when the alert was sent after the strongest shaking had arrived [29]. 
However, in a survey conducted for two earthquakes that struck Mexico 
City in 2017, the system was found to be useful in the first earthquake, 
where there were 90 s of warning but not as useful by respondents in the 
second earthquake, where there was little or no warning [52]. In Japan, 
while people’s responses were mixed on late alerts, most respondents 
nevertheless found the alerting system valuable as it was a confirmation 
that the earthquake had occurred, and trust in the system did not seem to 
be negatively affected [51]. Notably, more recent research shows that 
alerts provide information about earthquakes that recipients appreciate, 
even if they don’t feel the shaking [53]. Further, the Nakayuchi et al. 
[53] study revealed that only five percent of respondents were con-
cerned about receiving false alerts. 
Given the constraints of the system, exploring issues like system 
performance and suggested timeframes for responses to alerts, the drop, 
cover, and hold on (DCHO) suite of protective actions was deemed the 
best approach [38,54]. How false alerts may impact these actions is 
currently unknown, given the novelty of the system in the United States 
incorporating the DCHO protective actions. Overviews of the body of 
research relevant to understanding protective actions taken in response 
to early warnings suggest that false alerts do not necessarily hinder re-
sponses when the reasons for the false alert are communicated clearly, as 
argued in Mileti and Sorenson [55]. Lim et al. [56] explored the asso-
ciated human behavior with false alerts for extreme weather, specif-
ically around protective actions and found that respondents were 
generally not dissuaded by false alerts. However, Wogalter et al. [57] 
found that individuals’ response tendencies depend on the false alert 
rate; the more false alerts, the more likely people will begin to not take 
protective actions. The literature is still in flux regarding the issue of 
Fig. 2. From Given et al. [39]: schematic flowchart illustrating the architecture of the ShakeAlert system.  
Table 1 
ShakeAlert detection system performance. Data from the ShakeAlert Testing and 
Certification platform (TCP) from 2014 [48]. Successful events were detected 
correctly and alerts were distributed to test users. Missed events were either not 
detected or an alert was not issued even though the system should have pro-
duced an alert. Late events were detected by the system, but certain locations did 
not receive the information in advance because they were too close to the event 
to receive the alert before the strongest shaking arrived. Mislocated events were 
detected but their epicenters were incorrectly located. False alerts were not 
attributable to earthquakes and typically resulted from technical glitches. Note: 
This table uses terminology in the typology suggested in this article, explored 
fully in Table 2.  
Earthquake 
Magnitude 
Total 
Events 
Successful Missed Late Mislocated and 
false 
M6 11 8 1 0 2 
M4.5-6 26 14 8 3 1  
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false alerts. Yet more research is required on how people interpret and 
react to false alerts [58]. 
How people experience an earthquake and align this understanding 
with an alert received (or not) will vary from person to person, 
depending on their location, situation, and characteristics, as well as on 
the earthquake. Understanding human receiver characteristics (e.g., 
gender, age, culture, race, locus of control) is a critical component in 
developing any post-alert messaging brief. Receivers’ characteristics 
determine how they make sense of warnings; gender, age, and ethnicity 
are associated with levels of trust in information (see the review by 
Ref. [59]). False-alert-tolerant users or risk tolerance may also be a 
critical issue in terms of developing messaging [38]. Trust in commu-
nication channels can also vary by demographic group, as explored in 
Phillips & Morrow [59]. There is further evidence that psychological 
characteristics, such as feelings of internal or external “locus of control,” 
which is the degree in which individuals feel they have power over their 
lives, also influence the interpretation of alerts [60]. 
People with visual or auditory impairments, reading or learning 
disabilities, or those who cannot afford smartphones to download apps 
or receive WEAs, have diverse accessibility requirements [61]. Across 
the three states (California, Oregon, and Washington) involved in 
ShakeAlert, over 53 million residents and seven million visitors annually 
may experience ShakeAlert when it becomes fully available (U.S. Census 
data,20182). Further, approximately 9–20% of the population in these 
states, as of 2019, are new immigrants from other countries, suggesting 
that they may struggle with English as a language [62]. A further esti-
mated 16 million adults who may encounter ShakeAlert, as residents of 
California, Washington, and Oregon, have learning disabilities and 
struggle with literacy [63]. Vermeulen [64] and Sellnow et al. [8] sug-
gest that different publics may struggle with overly complex messaging. 
Given the constraints people may have in receiving and understanding 
post-alert messaging, it is better to use simple words and non-colloquial 
expressions to ensure that as many people as possible can understand the 
information provided to them. 
Understanding that requirements for rapid mass transmission of 
graphics are prohibitive with current technologies, and reflected in the 
literature cited above, the working group concluded that ShakeAlert 
post-alert text messages should be simple and descriptive as well as 
delivered over trusted and accessible multi-communication channels.  
3) Post-alert messaging decisions 
A critical step in generating the scenarios for post-alert messaging is 
assessing what is known immediately after an earthquake or when the 
system has issued a ShakeAlert Message. Knowledge of the monitoring, 
detection, and alerting performance determine a set of post-alert 
messaging decisions. This process can be represented by a decision 
flow chart (Fig. 3), which maps directly to the scenarios (Table 2 in the 
next section) and alert typology (Table 3 [65]). Fig. 3 highlights the 
limitations and constraints that the ShakeAlert operational team will 
face for post-alert messaging. Further, Fig. 3 highlights opportunities for 
longer-form responses stemming from early assessments, based on 
which information the ShakeAlert operational team does or does not 
have available to them at the time the post-alert message is sent. 
Understanding the critical steps and decisions that the USGS staff 
operating the ShakeAlert system may have to make immediately after an 
earthquake occurs and/or a ShakeAlert Message is issued and then 
combining it with self-reflective questions allowed us to determine the 
Fig. 3. Message decision flow chart.  
2 Retrieved on 14 April 2019 from https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/t 
able/ca, US/PST045217#PST045217 (California), https://www.census. 
gov/quickfacts/fact/table/OR,US/PST045217%20(Oregon), https://www.cens 
us.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/WA, US/PST045217 (Washington). 
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Table 2 
Earthquake alert scenarios, post-alert reasoning for communication, and potential messaging for various alerting platforms (WEA, Push Notification/Smartphone 
Apps, and Twitter).  
A) Scenario B) Response Reasoning C) WEA Message D) Push notification via Cell 
Phone App 
E) Twitter/Broadcast Media 
1. Successful Alert: A ShakeAlert 
Message was issued in time for 
people to take protective action. 
People felt shaking associated 
with the event. 
Communicating our successes is a 
way to inform people about how 
the system works and that when 
people act when they receive an 
alert message, harm is reduced. 
N/A. Initial alert message was 
distributed, no WEA follow up 
required. 
N/A. Initial alert message was 
distributed, no follow up 
required. 
A ShakeAlert Message was issued 
in response to the xx (name of 
earthquake) earthquake. If you 
took a protective action like Drop, 
Cover, and Hold On when you 
received an alert, you did the 
right thing (3). 
2. No Alert: An earthquake has 
occurred and shaking may have 
been felt, but the alerting 
threshold was not met. 
People may be concerned about 
why they felt the quake but didn’t 
receive an alert message.  
N/A, WEA not used as this 
channel is meant to only be 
used in times of emergency. 
There was an earthquake, but its 
magnitude did not meet alerting 
thresholds (1). If you took a 
protective action like Drop, 
Cover, and Hold On when you 
received an alert, you did the 
right thing (3). 
There was an earthquake, but its 
magnitude did not meet the 
threshold to issue a ShakeAlert 
Message (1). If you took a 
protective action like Drop, 
Cover, and Hold On when you 
received an alert, you did the 
right thing (3). 
3. Inaccurate Alert: event 
mislocated offshore or outside 
network, no shaking felt in 
alerted area. An earthquake has 
occurred, but it is offshore and/ 
or outside of ShakeAlert’s 
monitoring area. A ShakeAlert 
Message was issued but the 
earthquake magnitude and/or 
location is wrong. 
If an alert is sent incorrectly to a 
large urban center, particularly at 
night, it is highly likely to be a 
high-interest event. 
ShakeAlert Message canceled 
due to mislocated earthquake 
(1). If you took a protective 
action like Drop, Cover, and 
Hold On when you received 
the alert, you did the right 
thing (3). 
The ShakeAlert Message has been 
canceled due to a mislocated 
earthquake (1). If you took a 
protective action like Drop, 
Cover, and Hold On when you 
received an alert, you did the 
right thing (3). 
The ShakeAlert Message has been 
canceled due to a mislocated 
earthquake (1). We are working 
to improve our system (2). If you 
took a protective action like Drop, 
Cover, and Hold On when you 
received an alert, you did the 
right thing (3). 
4. Inaccurate Alert: event 
mislocated offshore or outside 
network, shaking felt in alerted 
area. An earthquake has 
occurred, but it is offshore and/ 
or outside of ShakeAlert’s 
monitoring area. A ShakeAlert 
Message was issued but the 
earthquake magnitude and/or 
location is wrong. 
An alert delivered to these 
communities would likely not do 
much harm, as they did feel 
shaking. However, it would be 
advisable to explain the location 
issues. 
ShakeAlert Message was 
issued in response to an 
earthquake (1). If you took a 
protective action like Drop, 
Cover, and Hold On when you 
received an alert, you did the 
right thing (3). 
A ShakeAlert Message was issued 
in response to an earthquake (1). 
You might have felt shaking. If 
you took a protective action like 
Drop, Cover, and Hold On when 
you received an alert, you did the 
right thing (3). 
We issued a ShakeAlert Message 
to people living in (area) (1). This 
alert message was in response to 
our network picking up (xxx) 
earthquake and mislocated it (2). 
If you took a protective action like 
Drop, Cover, and Hold On when 
you received an alert, you did the 
right thing (3). 
5. Inaccurate Alert: 
Underestimated magnitude that 
impacts the predicted ground 
shaking due to multiple 
earthquakes or swarms, thus 
the thresholds for public 
alerting were not met. 
The magnitude was 
underestimated. 
ShakeAlert Message canceled 
(1). If you dropped, covered, 
and held on or protected 
yourself, you did the right 
thing (3). 
A ShakeAlert Message was issued 
in response to an earthquake (1). 
You might have felt shaking. If 
you took a protective action like 
Drop, Cover, and Hold On when 
you received an alert, you did the 
right thing (3). 
The USGS issued a ShakeAlert 
Message and people living in 
(area) could have received an 
alert (1). The alert was in 
response to our network picking 
up (xxx) earthquake and 
incorrectly assessing the 
magnitude (2). If you took a 
protective action like Drop, 
Cover, and Hold On when you 
received an alert, you did the 
right thing (3). 
6. False Alert: One or more of the 
alerting delivery platforms 
(Apps, WEA, etc.) or the 
ShakeAlert system itself has 
experienced a technical issue 
which caused a ShakeAlert 
Message to be issued. 
People may be curious as to why 
they received an alert when no 
shaking was felt and no 
earthquakes were reported. 
ShakeAlert Message canceled 
due to false alert (1). If you 
took a protective action like 
Drop, Cover, and Hold On 
when you received an alert, 
you did the right thing (3). 
ShakeAlert Message canceled due 
to false alert (1). If you took a 
protective action like Drop, 
Cover, and Hold On when you 
received an alert, you did the 
right thing (3). 
ShakeAlert Message has been 
canceled due to false alert (1). 
The USGS is investigating (2). If 
you took a protective action like 
Drop, Cover, and Hold On when 
you received an alert, you did the 
right thing (3). 
7. Late Alert: An earthquake 
occurred that met the alerting 
thresholds, but people were too 
close to the epicenter to receive 
a timely alert. Shaking was felt 
in the “late alert zone". 
This type of alert message has 
human impact as it failed to alert 
people that shaking was coming. 
People may have been harmed or 
killed; this is a significant issue to 
acknowledge after a damaging 
earthquake. 
A ShakeAlert Message has 
been issued late which might 
have delayed alert delivery. 
(1). If you took a protective 
action like Drop, Cover, and 
Hold On when you received 
an alert, you did the right 
thing (3). 
A ShakeAlert Message was issued 
for xx earthquake. Some people 
may have been too close to the 
earthquake to receive an alert. If 
you took a protective action like 
Drop, Cover, and Hold On when 
you received an alert, you did the 
right thing (3). 
A ShakeAlert Message was issued 
for xx earthquake. Some people 
may have been too close to the 
earthquake to receive a alert. If 
you took a protective action like 
Drop, Cover, and Hold On when 
you received an alert, you did the 
right thing (3). 
8. Late Alert: System delay or 
technical delivery latency. An 
earthquake occurred that met 
the alerting thresholds, but it 
took the system too long to 
accurately characterize its 
magnitude. A ShakeAlert 
Message was issued but it was 
received after the shaking 
A ShakeAlert Message was issued 
but it took too long to accurately 
characterize the earthquake’s 
magnitude as it grew in size, so 
many people who felt significant 
shaking received the alert late. 
A large earthquake occurred 
but the ShakeAlert Message 
was issued late. If you took a 
protective action like Drop, 
Cover, and Hold On when you 
received an alert, you did the 
right thing (3). 
A large earthquake occurred but a 
ShakeAlert Message was issued 
late. If you took a protective 
action like Drop, Cover, and Hold 
On when you received an alert, 
you did the right thing (3). 
A large earthquake was reported 
but the ShakeAlert Message was 
issued late. We are working to 
improve this part of the system. If 
you took a protective action like 
Drop, Cover, and Hold On when 
you received an alert, you did the 
right thing (3). 
(continued on next page) 
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types of scenarios that the ShakeAlert operational team could face in the 
future. After we analyzed the decision flow chart, we then focused on the 
development of scenarios, using the decision flow chart as our guide.  
4 and 5) Earthquake alerts and post-alert scenarios with messages 
templates 
To develop a parsimonious but comprehensive set of scenarios, the 
working group closely examined the performance of the ShakeAlert 
system combined with earthquake behavior and performance of the 
telecommunications systems that ShakeAlert relies on for distribution. 
We then used a descriptive term to match the scenario described, as 
explored in Table 2. 
Further, for Table 2, we provided sample messages. Each of the post- 
alert messages begins with a simple statement on the status of the pre-
ceding ShakeAlert Message or earthquake, consistent with findings that 
communication of “all-clears” is vital to the warning message process 
[65]. These are in sentences identified with a (1). We further utilized 
aspects of the Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication (CERC) model, 
developed by Reynolds and Seeger [6], by providing a short description 
of the actions the USGS is currently undertaking to address the situation, 
identified as sentence (2) [17]. We diverted from the CERC model to the 
Protective Actions Decision Model, developed by Lindell and Perry [66] 
for our next message which focuses on confirmation of and support for 
Table 2 (continued ) 
A) Scenario B) Response Reasoning C) WEA Message D) Push notification via Cell 
Phone App 
E) Twitter/Broadcast Media 
arrived at some/many 
locations. 
9. Non-earthquake shaking: A 
non-earthquake event 
(explosion, quarry blast, or 
other cause) is detected on the 
system and a ShakeAlert 
Message was issued. Shaking 
may or may not be felt. 
If a ShakeAlert Message was 
issued due to this kind of shaking, 
the novelty factor will cause 
interest to be quite high. 
However, the actual cause of the 
alert may overshadow the alert. 
ShakeAlert Message not 
issued for a an earthquake but 
another event (insert cause if 
we know quickly) (1). If you 
took a protective action like 
Drop, Cover, and Hold On 
when you received an alert, 
you did the right thing (3). 
ShakeAlert Message not issued for 
an earthquake but another event 
(insert cause if we know quickly) 
(1). If you took a protective action 
like Drop, Cover, and Hold On 
when you received an alert, you 
did the right thing (3). 
ShakeAlert Message not issued for 
an earthquake but another event 
(insert cause if we know quickly) 
(1). If you took a protective action 
like Drop, Cover, and Hold On 
when you received an alert, you 
did the right thing (3). 
11. Missed Event: The event is 
detected by the ShakeAlert 
system, but the magnitude is 
underestimated and does not 
meet the magnitude threshold 
and no ShakeAlert Message was 
issued. Shaking may be felt. 
Given some people may have felt 
shaking, some response should be 
provided. 
N/A, as WEA was not used. An earthquake was detected by 
the ShakeAlert system but its 
magnitude was underestimated 
and it did not meet the threshold 
for issuing a ShakeAlert Message 
(1,2). If you took a protective 
action like Drop, Cover, and Hold 
On when you felt shaking, you did 
the right thing (3). 
An earthquake was detected by 
the ShakeAlert system but its 
magnitude was underestimated 
and it did not meet the threshold 
for issuing a ShakeAlert Message 
(1,2). If you took a protective 
action like Drop, Cover, and Hold 
On when you felt shaking, you did 
the right thing (3). 
12. Missed Event: aftershocks. 
The ShakeAlert System may be 
unable to detect an aftershock 
that follows a main event 
within several minutes. No 
ShakeAlert Message is issued 
but shaking is felt. 
Given some people may have felt 
shaking, some response should be 
provided. 
N/A, as WEA was not used for 
initial alert message. 
An earthquake has been reported 
as an aftershock to the xx 
earthquake; given the number of 
aftershocks, you may not receive 
an alert for all earthquakes (1,2). 
If you feel shaking, take 
protective action like Drop, 
Cover, and Hold On (3). 
An aftershock has been recorded 
from the xx earthquake (1). Given 
the number of aftershocks, you 
may not receive and alert s for all 
earthquakes (2). If you feel 
shaking, take protective action 
like Drop, Cover, and Hold On 
(3). 
13. Missed Alert: platform glitch. 
Technical issues mean that one 
or more of the alerting delivery 
platforms (APPs, WEA) has 
failed. 
There will likely be interest and 
the alerting platform providers 
may have to account for why the 
alert message was not sent to 
everyone. 
(if WEA fails, it is unlikely the 
problem can be addressed by 
sending a WEA a response to 
its non-response). 
(same as WEA). Dependent on the case and the 
alerting delivery platform failure. 
14. No Alert: epicenter outside 
ShakeAlert reporting area. The 
epicenter of the earthquake was 
outside the detection area, so no 
ShakeAlert Message was issued. 
However, it was a large 
earthquake and light shaking or 
more may have been felt at the 
user’s location. 
There will likely be interest, 
particularly if this is a large, 
damaging event. 
A large earthquake has been 
reported outside the 
ShakeAlert detection area (1). 
If you took a protective action 
like Drop, Cover, and Hold On 
when you felt shaking, you 
did the right thing (3). 
A large earthquake has been 
reported outside the ShakeAlert 
reporting area that may have 
produced shaking at your 
location (1). If you took a 
protective action like Drop, 
Cover, and Hold On when you felt 
shaking, you did the right thing 
(3). 
A large earthquake has been 
reported outside the ShakeAlert 
detection area that may have 
produced shaking at your 
location (1). Given the number of 
aftershocks expected for such an 
event, you may feel additional 
shaking without receiving an 
alert message (2). If you took a 
protective action like Drop, 
Cover, and Hold On when you felt 
shaking, you did the right thing 
(3). 
15. Unknown. It has not yet been 
identified why the alerts failed 
to be sent to some people but 
shaking was felt. 
People may be concerned as to 
why they did not receive an alert 
message, as they felt shaking but 
did not get an alert message. 
(WEA may not be working). (Push notifications may not be 
working). 
The ShakeAlert system detected 
an earthquake but a ShakeAlert 
message was not issued (1). We 
do not yet know why this 
occurred however we 
acknowledge that this experience 
is upsetting for many people (2). 
The USGS is investigating this 
issue and will keep updating 
information as we learn more. If 
you took a protective action like 
Drop, Cover, and Hold On when 
you felt shaking, you did the right 
thing (3).  
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effective protective actions (Drop, Cover, and Hold On), as explored in 
McBride et al. [54]; identified as sentence (3). Different nations use 
diverse protective actions for earthquakes, as explored in Goltz et al. 
[67]. It is important to note that while messages may be similar, these 
represent distinct scenarios that technicians and scientists may find 
themselves faced with regarding the ShakeAlert detection system. 
Table 2 is the basis for a situational typology for post-alert 
messaging, described in the next section. This typology provides a 
framework for ShakeAlert expectations about system performance and 
public response. These expectations stem from empirically grounded 
knowledge of earthquakes, of detection and monitoring system behav-
iors, human population exposures, situational interpretations, and 
responses. 
The post-alert template messages proposed for ShakeAlert in the 
scenario matrix (Table 2) are based on what is currently understood as 
effective content for alerts and warnings from the literature reviewed on 
messaging and behavior specifically, and professional communication 
expertise in the working group. The use of these messages and their 
numbered elements are illustrated in Table 2. The template messages 
focus on what occurred, or might still be happening post-alert, and what 
personal protective action could be taken, as suggested by Bean et al. 
[4]. Additional information is offered about messaging for specific 
channels and reasoning for communicating the message, as described in 
the results. 
In the development of the post-alert messages, the working group 
also considered what communications channels would be availa-
ble—WEA, push notifications (mobile applications), Twitter, and 
broadcast media (radio, print, television, online)—and their limitations, 
such as character limits, speed, and audience reach. Therefore, messages 
were crafted with attention to specific channel requirements (such as 
restrictions to character length) as well as using simple terminology. 
Because different groups trust messages from some channels but not 
others, as explored in Phillips & Morrow [59], the template recommends 
the channels of WEA, push notifications (opt-in apps), Twitter, and 
broadcast media for post-alert messaging. However, these messages 
should be tested and refined iteratively as ShakeAlert develops. 
We make several assumptions to develop the template messages. 
First, in the cases of late alerts, which occur because the earthquake 
origin is too close for an alert to be sent before the strongest shaking 
arrives, it is assumed that many telecommunications channels will likely 
be too oversaturated to send messages. Second, it may be difficult to 
determine exact scenarios of alerts (e.g., successful, false, missed, inac-
curate) in the first five to 10 min, so in many instances, more generalized 
information will have to suffice for immediate post-alert messaging.  
6) A fit-for-purpose earthquake alert typology 
A typology is a classification scheme; ours is informed by research on 
the communication of uncertainty in the context of natural hazards [68]. 
Although empirically informed, the suite of scenarios defined by the 
working group (Table 3) is conceptual and can be described as a ty-
pology, rather than a taxonomy, as typologies are more conceptual than 
empirically based taxonomies [69]. Table 3 illustrates the resulting ty-
pology including the following types of system performance (types of 
alerts): successful, false (technical glitch or no earthquake), missed, 
inaccurate, no alert, and late. These terms extend the simpler typologies 
derived from signal detection theory, as explored in Meyer et al. [70], 
and used in weather warnings and other alerting systems. The terms are 
chosen to identify distinguishing features of situations of relevance to 
interpretation and action, to be as descriptive as possible but still 
accessible for non-technical audiences, and to reflect common usage. 
Whether the wording choices achieve these goals remains to be tested. 
The typology in Table 3 is more extensive than the typical alerting 
quadrant (e.g. Fig. 1) and is required to account for the diverse scenarios 
that result from the physics of earthquakes, controls on ground shaking, 
the alerting and communication systems involved, and how these affect 
people. The detection subsystem can technically behave differently from 
the communication or alerting subsystem, especially if alerts are not sent 
for all detected events. Further, if there are technical glitches, alerts 
could be sent in the absence of detection. Detection of P-waves at mul-
tiple stations close to the epicenter, estimation of earthquake location 
and magnitude and the resulting ground motion, and activation of the 
alerting system are required to release a ShakeAlert Message [39]. Any 
of these systems could potentially fail or produce miscalculations lead-
ing to an incorrectly issued alert. Our development of the typology, 
along with the definitions in Table 2, combined with research on human 
behavior and communication channels led us to the development of a 
full suite of post-alert message templates. 
3. Limitations and recommendations 
There are limitations to our investigation and application of each of 
the three factors informing post-alert messaging: the earthquake, the 
ShakeAlert system, and human behavior. While we know much about 
earthquake hazards on the U.S. West Coast, new knowledge that is 
relevant to ShakeAlert performance in damaging earthquakes continues 
to emerge [38,71,72]. Performance of the ShakeAlert detection and 
monitoring system will change and likely improve as the earthquake 
monitoring networks that supportthe ShakeAlert system are built out. 
We further require more investigation regarding the initial message 
however, work has begun on this process, as explored by Sutton et al. 
[85]. The last factor, how people interpret and respond to post-alert 
messaging, is perhaps the most complex and least well understood or 
studied. We analyzed recommendations from the warning and crisis 
communication literature, with a focus on tornado and lahar research, 
given that time is a factor in both warnings and post-alert messaging for 
those hazards. The development of the messaging matrix in Table 2 
relied heavily on this literature, but we suggest that next steps for this 
research include a monitoring and evaluation program tailored specif-
ically for ShakeAlert, to help inform future development. 
A related limitation is that the proposed message templates have not 
yet been translated into other languages or designed to be accessible for 
those with visual or learning disabilities. This research signals a starting 
point for future research and development, as user testing is key to 
determine what iterations to post-alert messaging could be made in the 
future [65]. Accounting for visitors from non-English speaking coun-
tries, immigrants, and those with literacy or learning disabilities, the 
number of people who may struggle to understand ShakeAlert content 
may be as high as approximately 25 million people in the West Coast 
states, at any given time. This bears consideration when developing 
Table 3 
Typology of alerts. (X means that there was no occurrence and ✔ means that 
there was an occurrence.)  
Alerting Type Ground 
shaking 
detected 
Earthquake 
Detected 
Alerting 
Threshold met 
for alert 
Public Alert 
Sent and 
received before 
strong shaking 
arrives 
Successful Alert ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
False Alert 
(technical 
glitch) 
X X X ✔ (alert sent 
but no 
shaking) 
False Alert 
(shaking but 
not an 
earthquake) 
✔ X ✔ ✔ 
Missed Alert ✔ ✔ ✔ X (no alert 
sent) 
Inaccurate 
Alert 
✔ ✔ X Yes, but the 
detection was 
inaccurate. 
✔ 
No Alert ✔ ✔ X X 
Late Alert ✔ ✔ ✔ X  
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future post-alert messaging, as language and literacy are critical com-
ponents of understanding messages. 
A critical component of needed post-earthquake information in-
cludes the potential severity of aftershocks, with their possible location, 
timing, magnitude, rates, and frequency [73]. The USGS has developed a 
first response template for aftershock forecasts that is intended to be 
released within 30 min of the event [74,82]. This template provides 
information about what could be expected in terms of numbers and sizes 
of aftershocks. Further, it is critical to contextualize ShakeAlert as part of 
a suite of information products the USGS provides shortly after an 
earthquake occurs. These products include ShakeMap, Did You Feel It?, 
the Origin product (magntitude, location, depth), PAGER, and others 
[97]. Future consideration could be given to adding brief messages 
about aftershocks forecasts and other available earthquake informa-
tional products as part of ShakeAlert’s communication strategy. 
4. Conclusions 
The post-alert messaging framework presented here derives from 
observational data, the post alert messaging working group expertise 
with ShakeAlert system performance, earthquake behavior, reviewed 
literature on how people make sense of warnings for natural hazards, 
and information about how organizations communicate in crises. These 
factors are further informed and constrained by warning times (i.e., the 
amount of time between when an alert is received and strong shaking 
begins), accuracy and timeliness of ground motion prediction, and 
operator errors in the alerting system itself, as well as what people can 
and should do to protect themselves in response to alerts. Furthermore, 
we recommend that those responsible for communication refine this 
framework and the proposed messages iteratively, as evidence accu-
mulates regarding their use. This paper offers recommendations that 
could be taken into account in developing effective communications 
strategies and post-alert messaging for ShakeAlert and other EEW sys-
tems around the world. 
We argue that these messages represent the first response after an 
alert has been sent, not the last response from the USGS. Our post-alert 
messaging framework assumes and requires a comprehensive commu-
nication strategy that includes providing more information as the situ-
ation unfolds. Similarly, this article represents the beginning of our 
research on post-alert messaging rather than a final statement on the 
matter. 
This work represents a first attempt to identify, constrain, and craft 
messages to communicate about a system that is not yet fully publicly 
available across the West Coast of the U.S. Given the nature of both the 
system within the U.S. and emergent information and communication 
technologies, it has provided a unique opportunity to combine social 
science with seismology and technical systems for the USGS, the federal 
agency responsible for issuing the ShakeAlert Message and post-alert 
messaging. As the technologies and sciences regarding ShakeAlert 
evolve, so will the need for approaches to evaluate and refine future 
post-alert messaging. Further, the performance and decision analyses 
and alert typology developed in this paper provide a framework for 
future research, including testing and evaluations of the message tem-
plates we propose. 
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